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I. LESSONS FROM THE RELIGIOUS LAWYERING JOURNEY 
In tracing the contours of the religious legal theory “state of the 
field,” I would like to draw a parallel with the journey of what has 
been the focus of my work and scholarship for the past ten years: “re-
ligious lawyering”—the ongoing conversation about integrating reli-
gious values into the practice of law.
1
 
My Fordham colleague Russell Pearce and I have identified two 
“waves” in the religious lawyering movement.
2
  In its “first wave,” reli-
gious lawyering scholarship and organizational attention tended to 
be path-breaking or sporadic.
3
  Its tone was often exploratory and, at 
times, “apologetic.”
4
  From a professional perspective, the questions 
that formed the framework for this first wave included whether or not 
lawyers should bring religious values to bear on their professional 
work, and the extent to which such obligations might clash with other 
legal and ethical norms.
5
  From a religious perspective, questions of-
ten included the extent to which lawyers’ religious obligations ex-
 
 ∗ Director, Fordham University School of Law Institute on Religion, Law & Law-
yer’s Work.  This Essay was a plenary address to the Seton Hall University School of 
Law conference Religious Legal Theory: The State of the Field (November 12–13, 
2009).  Citations do not reflect a complete survey of the literature in the field; some 
of the essays noted herein do include a partial survey current through their date of 
publication.  
 1 For information and publications included thereon, see Institute on Religion, 
Law & Lawyer’s Work, Fordham Law Sch., http://law.fordham.edu/institute-
religion-law-lawyers-work/lawreligion.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2010).    
 2 See generally Russell G. Pearce & Amelia J. Uelmen, Religious Lawyering’s Second 
Wave, 21 J.L. & RELIGION 269 (2006).  The first part of this Essay includes some ma-
terial from previously published analyses of religious lawyering trends and scholar-
ship. 
 3 Id. at 272. 
 4 I use “apologetic” in the religious sense of the term.  See 1 Peter 3:15 (New In-
ternational Version) (“Always be prepared to give an answer to everyone who asks 
you to give the reason for the hope that you have.  But do this with gentleness and 
respect.”). 
 5 Pearce & Uelmen, supra note 2, at 272. 
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tended to their conduct as lawyers.
6
  Some commentators responded 
with caution, identifying both religious and professional considera-
tions that might limit or exclude religion’s influence in the profes-
sional domain.  One of the most prominent arguments against inte-
grating religious values was, in the words of Sanford Levinson, that 
professionalism requires lawyers to “bleach out” all personal aspects 
of their identity, including religion.
7
  In contrast, others expressly re-
jected the “bleaching out” analysis as a normative matter.
8
  Some em-
phasized instead either the conflict between faith and professional 
values,
9
 or the extent to which religious values coincide with profes-
sional values, such as obligations to promote justice and help the 
poor, and the ways in which legal ethics leaves lawyers discretion to 
bring their religion into their work.
10
  Others rejected the “bleaching 
out” analysis as a descriptive matter, asserting that religious lawyering 
and professionalism were mutually reinforcing or that many concep-
tions of religious lawyering fit well within the discretion afforded law-
yers under professionalism.
11
 
Russell Pearce and I have also critiqued the “bleached out” 
model for its tendency to sever people from the source of their deep 
values and commitments, which often leads to profound personal dis-
satisfaction and disorientation.
12
  In particular, we have highlighted 
that what is at stake in the religious lawyering conversation is not just 
the creation of a framework for the interaction of religion and law in 
professional and social life, but also the struggles of lawyers as people 
to find personal meaning and integration in their lives.
13
 
As Russell Pearce and I submit, “[a]t its core, religious lawyering 
is an invitation to appreciate the ways that [our] democracy leaves 
room for a variety of approaches and perspectives to enrich the prac-
 
 6 Id. at 274. 
 7 See Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer: Reflections on the Construction of 
Professional Identity, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1577, 1578 (1993).    
 8 See Pearce & Uelmen, supra note 2, at 275. 
 9 See id.  
 10 See id.  
 11 Pearce & Uelmen, supra note 2, at 275. 
 12 See Russell G. Pearce & Amelia J. Uelmen, Religious Lawyering in a Liberal Democ-
racy: A Challenge and an Invitation, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 127, 149–50 (2004). 
 13 Id. at 150–52; see also Amelia J. Uelmen, Can a Religious Person Be a Big Firm Liti-
gator?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1069, 1079 (1999) (“Let’s be clear about the stakes: ask-
ing me not to act in accord with [a sense of obligation grounded in religious reflec-
tion] . . . is to ask me to let go of my deepest sense of what it means to be a person.”).  
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tice of law without detracting from its essential values.”
14
  We believe 
that a more effective way to promote the rule of law is to honestly ac-
knowledge and manage our differences rather than deny that they 
exist.
15
  As Martha Minow has observed, “[Y]ou cannot avoid trouble 
through ignoring difference; you cannot find a solution in neutrali-
ty.”
16
 
Building on this increasing space for reflection, we see the 
“second wave” of religious lawyering scholarship as “tend[ing] to as-
sume that there should be space for lawyers to bring their religious 
values into their professional work, and thus focusing on more con-
crete and complex explorations of how to work as a religious lawyer.”
17
 
This is not to say that the second wave of religious lawyering 
scholarship skirts the pervasive questions about how faith perspectives 
may interact and clash in a liberal democracy.  Rule 2.1 of the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides that in counseling 
clients, lawyers are permitted to move beyond strictly “legal” consid-
erations in order to refer to a host of factors that might be relevant to 
a client’s particular situation,
18
 is the beginning, not the end, of the 
story.
19
 
Questions persist about exactly how lawyers and the legal profes-
sion can foster robust respect for diverse religious and cultural identi-
ties in our society.  Even if one welcomes the move toward a more 
transparent account of how religious values and frameworks might 
inform one’s legal work and interactions, questions remain about the 
impact of such integration on religious minorities.  A second and re-
lated worry is that allowing more room for religion in the public 
square will inevitably lead to divisiveness and intolerance, thus adding 
further fuel to the fires of polarizing culture wars.
20
 
Scholarship also continues to probe the extent to which some of 
these concerns and questions may be grounded in misperceptions 
and stereotypes about religion and religious people.  For example, 
 
 14 Pearce & Uelmen, supra note 12, at 159. 
 15 Id. 
 16 MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND 
AMERICAN LAW, 374–75 (1990). 
 17 Pearce & Uelmen, supra note 2, at 275. 
 18 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2007).  
 19 See Pearce & Uelmen, supra note 12, at 154–56; Pearce & Uelmen, supra note 2, 
at 276; Uelmen, supra note 13, at 1081–83, 1093–102. 
 20 See Pearce & Uelmen, supra note 12, at 157; Pearce & Uelmen, supra note 2, at 
276–77.  
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the assumption that religion leads to divisiveness is often based on a 
perception of religious traditions as monolithic.  But in reality, reli-
gious perspectives both within and among different religious tradi-
tions run the cultural gamut and intersect with secular perspectives at 
many points along the spectrum.  Further, the assumption that reli-
gious people are intolerant and incapable of complex interactions in 
a pluralistic society is a stereotype.  Beyond stereotypes, neither reli-
gious nor nonreligious people have a monopoly on small-mindedness 
or generosity of spirit.
21
 
So what is the upshot?  Religious lawyering scholarship, and the 
religious lawyering movement as a whole, has been sensitive and res-
ponsive to “secular” and professional critique and suggestions.  
Common sense would grant that if a lawyer’s religious approaches to 
lawyering generate discrimination or intolerance, the lawyer’s con-
duct should be subject to professional and social critique, and discip-
line where appropriate, just as any other approach to lawyering that is 
less than respectful of others.  Common sense would also grant that 
to the extent that religious approaches and perspectives are difficult 
for others to understand, religious lawyers should work harder to 
make themselves understood—as would be reasonable to ask of any 
attorney who fails to communicate her views effectively.
22
  In fact, re-
ligious lawyering’s second wave has included the work of creating in-
stitutional structures and more consistent forums through which law-
yers might reflect on and perhaps even “practice” articulating the 
connections that they are drawing between their religious faith and 
their practice areas.
23
 
How might this trajectory speak to the broader religious legal 
theory project?  As with religious lawyering, I believe we are past the 
first wave of religious legal theory.  The question is no longer “wheth-
er or not” religious perspectives should be integrated into legal scho-
 
 21 Pearce & Uelmen, supra note 12, at 158–59 (citations omitted); Uelmen, supra 
note 13, at 1083–86. 
 22 See Pearce & Uelmen, supra note 12, at 159; see also Uelmen, supra note 13, at 
1088–91. 
 23 Pearce & Uelmen, supra note 2, at 272–74.  The Institute on Religion, Law & 
Lawyer’s Work has programs that run along three “tracks”—those geared toward 
helping lawyers delve into the nexus between an area of practice and their specific 
faith tradition, those that aim to foster interfaith exchange, and those that bring in-
ternationally diverse legal professionals together.  INST. ON RELIGION, LAW & LAWYER’S 
WORK, FORDHAM LAW SCH., PROMOTING THE INTEGRATION OF RELIGIOUS VALUES INTO 
THE PRACTICE OF LAW 1, available at http://law.fordham.edu/assets/LawReligion/ 
Law_Religion_brochure.pdf.  
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larship.  Both as a normative and as a descriptive matter, many fo-
rums have welcomed religious perspectives as bringing a legitimate 
and even important contribution to legal theory.
24
  This approach al-
so fits neatly into other legal theory conversations that draw on how 
cultural perspectives inform and shape one’s view of the law and legal 
categories, and that reflect on how moral and ethical perspectives 
might be integrated into various fields of law.  As for religious lawyer-
ing, religious legal theory’s second wave questions are how to pursue 
this trajectory and what cultural equipment and institutional struc-
tures might foster the project’s depth and nuance. 
II. THEORIZING A SPACE BEYOND TOTALIZING THEORIES 
Several of the scholars presenting papers at this conference have 
focused on how religious legal theory poses a deep and provocative 
challenge to “totalizing” systems and their claims.  Zachary Calo, for 
example, discussed the human rights movement as an expression of 
western liberalism, which presents itself as a “totalizing moral theory” 
and which seems to leave very little room for contrasting theological 
accounts of human rights.
25
  Similarly, in the field of corporate law, 
Lyman Johnson brought religious legal theory to bear on the effort to 
move beyond the totalizing theory “profit-maximization” and, I would 
add, the chokehold that the harder edges of the law and economics 
 
 24 Many of the institutions that have dedicated resources to religious lawyering 
have also spawned programs, conferences and scholarship to explore the contours of 
religious legal theory.  See Pearce & Uelmen, supra note 2, at 272–73.  For develop-
ments in my own scholarship, I am indebted to the relatively new Conference on 
Catholic Legal Thought (CCLT), a summer colloquium initiated in June 2006, which 
now rotates geographically among various law schools.  See Fordham Univ. Sch. of 
Law, Catholic Legal Thought Conference, http://law.fordham.edu/institute-
religion-law-lawyers-work/11947.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2010).  The CCLT aims to 
foster a collegial exchange among law professors who teach and write “at the inter-
section of Catholic Social Thought and the Law.”  Id.  This, and other such collabor-
ative efforts, may also serve as a forum to support pretenured faculty as they navigate 
the issue of whether they should broach religious legal theory projects early in their 
careers—a question that surfaced during this symposium.   
 25 See Zachary R. Calo, Associate Professor of Law, Valparaiso Univ. Sch. of Law, 
Address at the Seton Hall University School of Law Religious Legal Theory Confe-
rence: Beyond Universalism: Religion, Human Rights and Post-Secular Legal 
Thought (Nov. 12, 2009) (on file with author) (discussing the role of religion in re-
sisting what Stephen Carter identifies as “the hegemonic pull of a totalizing liberal-
ism—that is a liberalism that moves beyond offering the basis for peaceful interac-
tion to embodying a complete worldview” (quoting Stephen L. Carter, Liberal 
Hegemony, Religious Resistance, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 25 
(2001))). 
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movement has had on how we imagine corporate law, structures, and 
responsibilities.
26
 
These “totalizing” theories run parallel to the “bleaching out” 
approach to the lawyer’s role.
27
  They often purport to function as a 
seemingly “neutral” rationale and accessible approach to a particular 
area of the law,
28
 but in reality these theories are just as value laden as 
any religious system of thought.  Once this limitation is unmasked, 
however, the worry remains that religious systems of thought intro-
duce the danger of clashing totalizing theories, with the added con-
cern that not all of the resources brought into the conversation will 
be completely accessible to all of the conversation partners.  Are the 
various strains of religious legal theory simply other totalizing theo-
ries that tend to monopolize and shut down the discourse?  Is reli-
gion, as Richard Rorty put it, “a conversation stopper?”
29
 
Having observed the religious lawyering discourse for some time, 
I believe that some of these worries might be grounded in mispercep-
tions, stereotypes, and a lack of actual experience in constructive 
conversation and exchange across traditions, including religious tra-
ditions.  In my experience, actual engagement with diverse religious 
traditions and perspectives, when it unfolds in an atmosphere of sin-
cerity and trust, often opens out toward an increasing appreciation, 
not only for the complexity of the various traditions and how they 
might engage one another, but also for how they might intersect with 
secular streams of thought.
30
 
 
 26 See Lyman Johnson, Robert O. Bentley Professor of Law, Washington & Lee 
Univ. Sch. of Law and Lejeune Distinguished Chair in Law, Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. 
of Law, Address at the Seton Hall University School of Law Religious Legal Theory 
Conference: Re-Enchanting the Corporation (Nov. 12, 2009), in 1 WM. & MARY BUS. 
L. REV (forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1519103. 
 27 See Levinson, supra note 7, at 1578. 
 28 See generally Kevin P. Lee, The Foundations of Catholic Legal Theory: A Primer, in 
RECOVERING SELF-EVIDENT TRUTHS: CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN LAW 15, 18-
21 (Michael A. Scaperlanda & Teresa Stanton Collett eds., 2007).   
 29 Richard Rorty, Religion as a Conversation Stopper, 3 COMMON KNOWLEDGE 1 
(1994). 
 30 My own exposure to interreligious dialogue is grounded in the theory and 
practice of the Focolare, one of the relatively new movements within the Roman 
Catholic Church.  See JOHN L. ALLEN, JR., THE FUTURE CHURCH 188–90 (2009) (dis-
cussing the Focolare’s approach to interreligious dialogue); Amelia J. Uelmen, Recon-
ciling Evangelization and Dialogue Through Love of Neighbor, 52 VILL. L. REV. 303 (2007) 
[hereinafter Uelmen, Reconciling]; Amy Uelmen, Walking Together in Jerusalem, LIVING 
CITY, May 2009, at 10 (reflecting on the Focolare’s third international Jewish-
Christian symposium). 
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If religious legal theories are not in and of themselves “totaliz-
ing” claims, or if they are not intended to have “totalizing” effect, 
then the key question becomes: how do we theorize a space beyond 
totalizing theories?  If I were to map the future of the religious legal 
theory project, I would leave plenty of room for each religious tradi-
tion to explore the religious resources that might foster open conver-
sation in a pluralistic society, without denying the need for a space to 
work out each tradition’s distinctive contribution to the conversation.  
A related project would be to explore how religiously grounded 
frameworks might run parallel to, or be in conversation with, the re-
sources of other traditions or with secular frameworks. 
To make this concrete, I would like to give a snapshot of how I 
am wrestling with my current work in progress, which explores 
whether Trinitarian theology might shed light on the common-law 
doctrine that there is generally no tort duty to rescue, even to “easy” 
rescue.
31
  Here is the well-worn example: a small child is drowning in 
a wading pool, and a passerby, with no danger to herself, could easily 
reach in and pull the child out of the water.  Does the passerby have 
any legal duty to help?  For most first-year law students, it comes as a 
shock to learn that in almost all jurisdictions in the United States the 
answer is no.
32
 
As the story goes, one of the central problems in imposing a le-
gal duty to rescue is that it interferes with the notion of liberty in 
which the self and others are in fundamental tension.  As Professor 
Richard Epstein wrote in his staunch defense of the no-duty-to-rescue 
rule, “Once one decides that . . . an individual is required under 
some circumstance to act at his own cost for the exclusive benefit of 
another, then it is very hard to set out in a principled manner the 
limits of social interference with individual liberty.”
33
  Or, as philoso-
pher Michael Menlowe summarized, “The more I have to do for oth-
er people, the less I can do for myself. . . . The more extensive the du-
ty to rescue, the more an agent’s individuality is threatened.”
34
  “If I 
 
 31 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965) (“The fact that the actor rea-
lizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary for another’s aid or protec-
tion does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such action.”). 
 32 See, e.g., WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 340 (4th ed. 
1971). 
 33 See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 198 
(1973). 
 34 Michael A. Menlowe, The Philosophical Foundations of Duty to Rescue, in THE DUTY 
TO RESCUE: JURISPRUDENCE OF AID 5, 38 (Michael A. Menlowe & Alexander McCall 
Smith eds., 1993).  
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am required to promote the good,” I may be prohibited from regard-
ing my own interests as special, and then my integrity is threatened.
35
 
The project to which I have been drawn is to take arguably the 
most mysterious of quintessentially Christian dogma, the Trinity, and 
explore how contemporary Trinitarian theology might help resolve 
knotty problems in legal theory.
36
  So far it has not been a conversa-
tion stopper.  In fact, the first person to encourage me in this work 
was my Jewish torts professor, who resonated deeply with the frame-
work.
37
 
Here is one way to describe the connection between Trinity and 
human relationships, from a Roman Catholic perspective: 
 The revelation in Christ of the mystery of God as Trinitarian 
love is at the same time the revelation of the vocation of the hu-
man person to love.  This revelation sheds light on every aspect of 
the personal dignity and freedom of men and women, and on the 
depths of their social nature.
38
 
A document from the Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et spes, 
explains further: 
 Indeed, the Lord Jesus, when He prayed to the Father, “that 
they may all be one . . . as we are one” opened up vistas closed to 
human reason, for He implied a certain likeness between the un-
ion of the divine Persons, and the unity of God’s sons in truth and 
charity.  This likeness reveals that man, who is the only creature 
on earth which God willed for itself, cannot fully find himself ex-
cept through a sincere gift of himself.
39
 
What work does this model do?  Pope Benedict XVI connected 
some of the dots between Trinitarian theology and the social sciences 
in his recent analysis of social and economic life, Charity in Truth (Ca-
 
 35 Id.   
 36 See, e.g., Amelia J. Uelmen, Toward a Trinitarian Theory of Products Liability, 1 J. 
CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 603, 604 (2004) (discussing how Catholic Social Thought can 
offer profound solutions to the knottiest dilemmas in products liability theory). 
 37 Id. at 603 (dedicating the article to Professor Michael H. Gottesman, my first-
year torts professor at Georgetown University Law Center “whose profound humanity 
deeply influenced my initial exposure to and critique of products liability theories”). 
 38 PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE & PEACE, COMPENDIUM OF THE SOCIAL 
DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH pt. 1, ch.1, § III.a, ¶ 34, at 16 (2003).  The Compendium 
summarizes the tradition of papal commentary on contemporary social and econom-
ic conditions, which began in 1871 with a letter on working conditions, Rerum Nova-
rum. 
 39 SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, PASTORAL CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH IN THE 
MODERN WORLD: GAUDIUM ET SPES  ¶ 24 (1965) (quoting John 17:21–22 and citing Luke 
17:33).   
UELMEN (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/24/2010  2:15 PM 
2010] SECOND WAVE 963 
 
ritas in veritate).
40
  According to the pope, Trinitarian theology can 
provide the basis for a vision of individual fulfillment in the context 
of the unity of the human family: the life of communion at the heart 
of the Trinity is a lens through which we can see “all individuals and 
peoples within the one community of the human family.”
41
  The pope 
further explained: “God desires to incorporate us into this reality of 
communion as well: ‘that they may be one even as we are one.’”
42
 
In addition, reflections on the Trinitarian life of God can pro-
vide insight into what it might mean for a human being to “open 
oneself” and relate to the needs of others without having one’s own 
identity swallowed up in the process.  According to Pope Benedict, in 
the life of the Trinity, “true openness means, not loss of individual 
identity, but profound interpenetration.”
43
  This is possible through 
an essential attitude of openness to the other, of “making room” for 
the other, even to the point of “emptying” oneself for the other, in 
Greek, kenosis.
44
  In a Trinitarian model, this openness or emptiness is 
not a negative encroachment on one’s personhood, but actually the 
positive key to self-fulfillment.
45
  Freedom consists of the essential ca-
pacity to open oneself to the other.  It is, at its core, relational.
46
 
On the flip side, Pope John Paul II had explained in a 1991 doc-
ument, Centesimus annus: 
When man does not recognize in himself and in others the value 
and grandeur of the human person, he effectively deprives him-
self of the possibility of benefitting from his humanity and of en-
tering into that relationship of solidarity and communion with 
others for which God created him.  Indeed, it is through the free 
gift of self that man truly finds himself.
47
 
 
 40 See generally Pope Benedict XVI, Encyclical Letter, Caritas in veritate [Charity in 
Truth] ¶ 34 (June 29, 2009). 
 41 Id. ¶ 54.  
 42 Id. (quoting John 17:22). 
 43 Id.  
 44 Uelmen, supra note 36, at 623 (citing John Paul II, Apostolic Letter, Novo mil-
lennio inuente ¶ 43 (Jan. 6, 2001)). 
 45 Id. at 623–24 (discussing the link with Pope John Paul II’s description of a “spi-
rituality of communion”). 
 46 Amelia J. Uelmen, Traveling Light: Pilgrim Law and the Nexus Between Law, Politics 
and Catholic Social Teaching, 22 J.L. & RELIGION 445, 473–74 (2007) (discussing the 
link with Pope John Paul II’s analysis in Centesimus annus, infra note 47). 
 47 Pope John Paul II, Encyclical Letter, Centesimus annus [The Hundredth Year] ¶ 
41 (May 1, 1991) [hereinafter Centesimus annus]. 
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Applied to social relationships, Trinitarian theology pushes 
beyond an effort to manage fairly what would otherwise be clashing 
interests.
48
  Because this theological lens posits that a life of commu-
nion is the essence of the structure of reality, one many submit that 
to act in a way that acknowledges the other as the living image of 
God, to “make room” for the other, is a true and positive good and 
more characteristic of an authentically human life.
49
 
Returning to the problem of the common law no-duty-to-rescue, 
viewing social relationships through the lens of Trinitarian theology 
reveals the full consequences of the notion that the drowning stran-
ger and I are part of the same human community, and in some way 
even resolves the central tension between the needs of the victim and 
the freedom of the rescuer.
50
  The central dynamic shifts away from a 
question of balancing, because through this Trinitarian lens, open-
ness to another’s needs, in this case the need for emergency assis-
tance, is not an inconvenience but an opportunity for human fulfill-
ment.
51
 
Further, if I walk away from the drowning person, the problem is 
the drastic impact, not only on the “stranger,” but also on myself.  To 
paraphrase John Paul II, if I do not recognize in others the value and 
grandeur of the human person, I effectively deprive myself of the 
possibility of entering into a relationship of solidarity and commu-
 
 48 See Uelmen, supra note 36, at 624–25 (discussing how a Trinitarian dynamic 
pushes beyond a model based on social contract or principles of equality); see also 
Luigino Bruni & Amelia J. Uelmen, Religious Values and Corporate Decision Making: The 
Economy of Communion Project, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 645, 651–53 (2006) (dis-
cussing an economic model based on similar principles). 
 49 Uelmen, supra note 36, at 625–26.  See also Bruni & Uelmen, supra note 48, at 
648 (“[T]he essence of human experience is to be ‘in communion. . . .’  In the core 
of our being, our deepest fulfillment is found in a life of communion, in loving, in 
giving.”). 
 50 Cf. Uelmen, supra note 46, at 477 (“Viewing equality through the lens of reci-
procal love helps everyone to see their own radical dependence on others, and the 
value of building structures in which . . . forms of social organization, production 
and consumption make it easier for people to offer the gift of self and to establish 
solidarity between people.”). 
 51 Cf. id. at 475 (“When freedom is defined through a Trinitarian lens, the privi-
leged classes can know that ‘giving the poor their rights’ is their own door to human 
fulfillment. . . .” (quoting ROBERT E. RODES, LAW AND LIBERATION 214 (1986)). 
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nion with others for which God created me.
52
  If I walk away, I deny 
the essence of who I am and of what it means to be human.
53
 
But the question, and potential problem, is whether this frame-
work, which is so explicitly grounded in Catholic theology, is destined 
to remain an internal discourse just among Catholics or Christians.  
Here the experience of the religious lawyering movement might be 
helpful.  Remember that what is at stake in the religious lawyering 
conversation is not just a framework for the interaction of religion 
and law in professional and social life, but also the struggles of law-
yers as people to find personal meaning and integration in their 
lives.
54
  In this light, to frame the religious lawyering project as one of 
finding an “overlapping consensus”
55
 is too thin, too reductive, and 
too impoverished.  As a lawyer, I need to make sense of my own work, 
my own commitments, and my own interactions with clients—all with-
in the particularity of the tradition that I carry within me.  Of course I 
will also need to find a language to express these commitments in a 
pluralistic society, but I submit that the work of finding language is in 
many ways a distinct effort. 
Might this struggle to find meaning and integrity in legal prac-
tice speak to our work in legal theory as well?  Might it help us to 
frame the religious legal theory project as an invitation to push 
beyond efforts to find an overlapping consensus or a common lan-
guage? 
Why is it that I love listening to my friends of religious traditions 
different from my own when they explain to me the stories from the 
Mishnah and Midrash or from the Q’ran?  What happens in me when I 
open my mind and heart to a view of the world and to an analysis of 
social structures drawn from a tradition not my own?  First, it opens 
me to the person who is sharing the story.  One of the reasons that I 
want to listen to their stories is because I want to understand more 
deeply the imaginative structures that ground their own commit-
ments.  Second, it also opens the doors to my own imagination, help-
ing me to probe more deeply into my own tradition, and perhaps also 
 
 52 Centesimus annus, supra note 47, ¶ 41. 
 53 Cf. SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, supra note 39, ¶ 27 (acts inimical to life and hu-
man dignity “do more harm to those who practice them than those who suffer from 
the injury”). 
 54 See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text. 
 55 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 340 (rev. ed., The Belknap Press of Har-
vard Univ. Press 1999) (1971) (using the term “overlapping consensus” in the con-
text of a discussion of civil disobedience). 
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challenging my own framework in a healthy and productive way.  Le-
gal philosopher Jeremy Waldron captured this dynamic beautifully: 
 Even if people are exposed in argument to ideas over which 
they are bound to disagree . . . it does not follow that such expo-
sure is pointless or oppressive.  For one thing, it is important for 
people to be acquainted with the views that others hold.  Even 
more important, however, is the possibility that my own view may 
be improved, in its subtlety and depth, by exposure to a religion 
or a metaphysics that I am initially inclined to reject.
56
 
Returning to the no-duty-to-rescue example, one could find nu-
merous examples of parallel paths to a similar conclusion.  For ex-
ample, the deontological case for a duty to rescue argues that mutual-
ly restraining duties are appropriate because physical integrity is not 
merely one end, but a requirement and precondition, in the words of 
Kant, the “basic stuff,”
57
 without which one may not realize one’s 
ends.  As Ernest J. Weinrib summarized: 
 An individual contemplating his actions from a moral point of 
view must recognize that all others form their project on a sub-
stratum of physical integrity.  If he claims the freedom to pursue 
his projects as a moral right, he cannot as a rational and moral 
agent deny to others the same freedom.
58
 
One could articulate something of an overlapping consensus with the 
analysis that emerges from the lens of Trinitarian theology, and one 
could probably trim away the theology-specific footnotes in order to 
make a palatable point. 
But I submit that if our conversations about legal theory are re-
duced only to these common denominators, we will miss an impor-
tant opportunity to “thicken” the discourse and, in this case, the “ra-
tionality” of protecting the physical integrity of others.  In this case, 
for example, the resources of Trinitarian theology bring into relief a 
different flavor and a different emphasis—namely that the duty to 
rescue is grounded not only in the realization that I owe to others the 
same freedom that I claim, but also in an overarching vision of the 
other as “a part of me” in which my own fulfillment and happiness 
 
 56 Jeremy Waldron, Religious Contributions in Public Deliberation, 30 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 817, 841–42 (1993). 
 57 IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 195 (Cambridge Univ. Press 
1996) (1797). 
 58 Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 288 (1980). 
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hinge on the possibility of building relationships of love and justice 
with others.
59
 
Might my own theological framework be “thickened” by an on-
going discourse with non-theological resources?  I do see religious le-
gal theory as journeying on a multilaned highway.  For example, in A 
Theory of Justice, John Rawls’s most compelling argument in favor of a 
duty to rescue was not the Kantian principle that we should help oth-
ers because we may one day need their help, but rather the horror of 
living in a society in which no one had the slightest desire to act on 
the duty to aid, for this would “express an indifference if not disdain 
for human beings that would make a sense of our own worth imposs-
ible.”
60
  Do I understand this analysis more deeply after having spent 
some time with Trinitarian theology?  I think so. 
I believe that if we move beyond the effort to find an overlap-
ping consensus or a common language toward a sheer appreciation 
and enjoyment of simply absorbing and learning from each other’s 
even very different traditions and points of view, we might be sur-
prised by the depths of the new perspectives and questions that 
emerge and by the discovery of paths to travel, even together. 
III. THEORIZING A SPACE FOR MULTIPLE NARRATIVES 
Another reason why I am interested in a more expansive role for 
integrating religious resources into tort theory is that I am in the 
process of changing my mind on whether the legal and procedural 
structure of our current common law system could accommodate a 
cause of action for failure to rescue—even failure to rescue in an 
“easy” case which poses no physical threat to the potential rescuer. 
What if I come to the conclusion that even the powerful lens of 
Trinitarian theology would not solve a core procedural and philo-
sophical dilemma, that a “universal duty” is simply too unmanageable 
for a cause of action in our common law system?
61
  What happens if, 
in spite of the effort to redefine freedom, rationality, and human 
 
 59 Uelmen, supra note 36, at 621 (quoting U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, 
SHARING CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING: CHALLENGES AND DIRECTIONS 1 (1998)); see also 
PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE & PEACE, supra note 38, ¶ 35, at 16–17 (“Every per-
son . . . fulfils himself by creating a network of multiple relationships of love, justice 
and solidarity with other persons while he goes about his various activities in the 
world.”). 
 60 RAWLS, supra note 55, at 298. 
 61 See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr., Process Constraints in Tort, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 
901, 901 (1982) (supporting the no-duty-to-rescue rule on procedural rather than 
substantive grounds). 
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identity through the lens of Trinitarian theology, I come up with es-
sentially the same result as liberal legal theory: no common-law duty 
to rescue?  If I end up not arguing for a normative change in the law, 
does looking at the issue through the lens of Trinitarian theology 
have anything to add to our conversation about the law? 
I am still exploring the contours of this idea, but I think it starts 
with the proposition that the stories we tell about the philosophical 
moorings of the law do matter—for ourselves, for our students, and 
for our culture as a whole—and that religious legal theory might be a 
powerful resource in how we think about these narratives.  As dis-
cussed above, the philosophical narrative that is generally recounted 
about the no-duty-to-rescue rule is that our torts system is grounded 
in a notion of liberty in which the self and others are in fundamental 
tension.
62
  In fact, the no-duty-to-rescue narratives might even be em-
blematic of the broader and deeper tensions in our legal system as a 
whole.
63
 
In this case, religious legal theory might illuminate a space to 
discuss different narratives about the philosophical moorings of the 
law in general and specific laws in particular.  Is the fact that our 
common-law system would find it unmanageable to navigate a univer-
sal duty to rescue, regardless of a causative link to injury, necessarily 
grounded in a story about the law’s hyper-individualistic emphasis on 
freedom as autonomy?  Perhaps not.  One of the contributions that 
religious legal theory might bring to the overarching discourse is its 
capacity to illuminate some of the ways in which “law’s empire” is li-
mited.
64
  In particular, it could help us to see the ways in which the 
structure of a cause of action might not tell the whole story about 
freedom, rationality, and human identity, and it could help explain 
how our conversations about the law might allow multiple narratives.  
One of the contributions of religious legal theory might be to point 
us toward the need for a broader set of resources, including religious 
and theological resources, to probe more deeply the law’s relation-
ship to morality and philosophical meaning. 
Our discourse in legal theory often assumes that normative con-
versations about the law are geared toward affecting or changing the 
 
 62 See Epstein, supra note 33, at 198. 
 63 For a thoughtful discussion of how the no-duty-to-rescue rule has reflected 
shifting cultural tides, see MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF 
POLITICAL DISCOURSE 76–98 (1991). 
 64 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 407–08 (1986) (discussing expansiveness of 
“law’s empire”). 
UELMEN (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/24/2010  2:15 PM 
2010] SECOND WAVE 969 
 
norms embedded in the law.  The question of whether religious legal 
theory might pose a challenge to that assumption would merit fur-
ther exploration as well. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A final reason to claim a space beyond totalizing theories, for 
multiple narratives, is for the sake of our students, who, in “ordinary 
religion of the law school classroom,” as Dean Roger C. Cramton put 
it, believe that “[s]ince the lawyer is engaged in the implementation 
of the values of others . . . he [or she] need not be concerned directly 
with value questions.”
65
  Law students are not known as risk-takers.  
Many are convinced that if they take even a few steps off the beaten 
path, they will be instantly fired, and in the current market, their an-
xiety is undoubtedly heightened. 
So are we stuck?  In this regard it might be helpful to focus on 
another stream within faith traditions: the prophetic role.  Even if it 
seems to rub the wrong way, planting the seeds for alternative pers-
pectives—or even just creating some space for the possibility of such 
alternatives—might be for our students a precious gift that opens the 
door to helping them find meaning in their lives as lawyers.  We need 
to expose students to all of the ways in which their lives in the law al-
low them to engage the whole human experience, including faith 
perspectives, and to discover the possible paths to an integrity that 
can fully embrace what they believe, how they see the world, and what 
they do. 
 
 65 Roger C. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 247, 250 (1978). 
